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Abstract — Network steganography is a relatively new
discipline which studies different steganographic techniques
that utilize network protocols for data hiding. Internet of
Things (IoT) is a concept which integrates billions of embedded
devices that communicate to each other. To the best of our
knowledge, there are not many attempts that utilize existing
network steganographic techniques in protocols specifically
created for IoT. Therefore, in this paper, we present several
new covert channels that utilize the Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP), which is a specialized Web transfer protocol
used for constrained devices and networks. This protocol can
be used regardless of its transport carrier (Datagram
Transport Layer Security - DTLS or clear UDP – User
Datagram Protocol). The suggested covert channels are
categorized according to the pattern-based classification, and,
for each covert channel, the total number of hidden data bits
transmitted per CoAP message or its Packet Raw Bit Rate
(PRBP) is given.
Keywords-CoAP; network steganography; covert channels;
data hiding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network covert channels are used to hide data in
legitimate transmissions in communication networks by
deploying different network protocols as carriers and
concealing the presence of hidden data from network
devices. Covert channels (first introduced by Lampson [8])
can be divided in two basic groups: storage and timing
channels. Storage covert channels are channels where one
process writes (directly or indirectly) to a shared resource,
while another process reads from it. In the context of
network steganography, storage covert channels hide data by
storing them in the protocol header and/or in the Protocol
Data Unit (PDU). On the other hand, timing channels hide
data by deploying some form of timing of events, such as
retransmitting the same PDU several times, or changing the
packet order.
Network-based covert channels may have black hat or
white hat applications. Black hat applications include
coordination of distributed denial of service attacks,
spreading of malware (for example, by hiding command and
control traffic of botnets), industrial espionage, secret
communication between terrorists and criminals, etc. On the
other hand, white hat applications include covert military
communication in hostile environments, prevention of
detection of illicit information transferred by journalists or
whistle-blowers, circumvention of the limitation in using
Internet in some countries (e.g., Infranet [3]), providing
Quality of Service - QoS for Voice over Internet Protocol -
VoIP traffic [10], secure network management
communication [5], watermarking of network flows (e.g.,
RAINBOW [6]), tracing encrypted attack traffic or tracking
anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls [16][17], etc.
Nowadays, there are a plenty of choices in the landscape
of network protocols for carriers. There are several surveys
about different covert channels in many TCP/IP
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) protocols
[12][19]. To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few
papers about network steganographic research addressing
protocols specialized for constrained devices in the IoT
(sensors, vehicles, home appliances, wearable devices, and
so on) [2] [7]. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
[15] is a specialized Web transfer application layer protocol
which can be used with constrained nodes and constrained
networks in the IoT. The nodes are constrained because they
have 8-bit microcontrollers, for example, with limited
random-access memory (RAM) and read-only memory
(ROM). Constrained networks often have high packet error
rates and small data rate (such as IPv6 over Low-Power
Wireless Personal Area Networks - 6LoWPANs). CoAP is
designed for machine-to-machine (M2M) applications and
its last stable version was published in June 2014 in the RFC
7252 [15]. In fact, it is a Representational State Transfer -
RESTful protocol with multicast and observe support. In this
paper, we try to apply existing network steganographic
techniques for creating covert channels in CoAP.
Wendzel et al. [18] presented a new pattern-based
categorization of network covert channel techniques into 11
different patterns or classes. They represented the patterns in
a hierarchical catalog using the pattern language Pattern
Language Markup Language (PLML) v. 1.1 [4]. In our
paper, we use their classification to characterize our covert
channels.
Covert channels are analyzed through the total number of
hidden data bits transmitted per second (Raw Bit Rate -
RBR), or through the total number of hidden data bits
transmitted per PDU (for example, Packet Raw Bit Rate-
PRBR) [11]. For each new CoAP channel, its PRBR value is
given, where PDU is a CoAP message.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The
related work is presented in Section 2. Details about the
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CoAP header, messages, functionalities and concepts are
presented in Section 3. The main Section 4 describes eight
groups of new covert storage and timing channels in CoAP,
that can be used regardless its transport carrier (DTLS or
clear UDP). Some possible applications of these covert
channels are also briefly suggested in this section. In Section
5 we present the performance evaluation. We conclude the
paper in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
The research on network steganography for IoT has seen
an increased interest recently.
One example for this is the work of Islam et al. [7],
which uses Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) covert
channels for authenticating Internet packet routers as an
intermediate step towards proximal geolocation of IoT
devices. This is useful as a defense from the knowledgeable
adversary that might attempt to evade or forge the
geolocation. Hidden data are stored in the data field of the
ICMP Echo Request and ICMP Echo Reply messages.
Some applications of steganography in IoT are not
connected with the protocols themselves, but with the
applications on top of these protocols. For example, Denney
et al. [2] present a novel storage covert channel on wearable
devices that sends data to other applications, or even to other
nearby devices, through the use of notifications that are
normally displayed on the status bar of an Android device.
For that purpose, a notification listening service on the
wearables needs to be implemented. Data are hidden in the
notification ID numbers (32 bits), and their exchange is done
by using two functions notify and cancel. If the notifying
function is immediately followed by the canceling function,
the notification is never displayed to the user although it can
be seen in the log files, so the communication is hidden from
the user who wears the device.
There are several papers that deploy steganography in the
physical and medium access control (MAC) layers of the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard [9][13].
III. HOW COAP WORKS
Similar to HTTP, CoAP uses client/server model with
request/response messages. It supports built-in discovery of
services and resources, Uniform resource identifiers (URIs)
and Internet media types. The CoAP sends a request message
requesting an action (using a Method Code) to the resource
(identified by a URI) hosted on a server. The server responds
to this request by using the response message that contains
the Response Code, and possibly some resource
representation. CoAP defines four types of messages:
Confirmable (CON), Non-Confirmable (NON),
Acknowledgment (ACK) and Reset (RST). These types of
messages use method and response codes to transmit
requests or answers. The requests can be transmitted as
Confirmable and Non-Confirmable types of messages, while
the responses can be transmitted through these and via
piggybacked and Acknowledgment types of messages.
CoAP uses clear UDP or DTLS on transport layer to
exchange messages asynchronously between endpoints. As
shown in Figure 1, each message contains a Message ID
used for optimal reliability and to detect duplicates. A
message that requires reliable transmission is marked as
CON, and if does not, it is marked as NON. The CON
message is retransmitted using a default timeout and binary
exponential back-off algorithm for increasing the timeout
between retransmissions, until the recipient sends an ACK
message with the same Message ID. When the recipient is
Figure 1. a) Reliable CoAP message transmission b) Unreliable CoAP
message transmission.
not able at all to process CON or NON messages, it replies
with a RST message.
CoAP messages are encoded into simple binary format
(see Figure 2). Each message starts with a 4B fixed header,
followed by a Token field, with size from 0 to 8B. Then
comes the optional Options field and optional Payload field.
If the Payload field is present it is preceded by one-byte
Payload Marker (0xFF).
The fields that make up the message header are the
following:
 Version (Ver) - 2-bit unsigned integer that identifies the
CoAP version. Currently it must be set to 01.
 Type (T) – 2-bit unsigned integer that indicates the
message type: Confirmable (0), Non-Confirmable(1),
Acknowledgement (2), or Reset (3).
 Token Length (TKL) – 4-bit unsigned integer that stands
for the length of the Token field (0-64 bits). Lengths 9-
15 are reserved and must be processed as a message
format error.
 Code – 8-bit unsigned integer. It is divided into two
parts: 3-bit class (the most significant bits) and 5-bit
details (the least significant bits). The format of the code
is “c.dd”, where “c” is a digit from 0 to 7 and represents
the class while “dd” are two digits from 00 to 31.
According to the class we can determine the type of the
message, such as: request (0), a successful response (2),
a client error response (4), or a server error response (5).
CoAP has a separate code registry that provides a
description for all codes [1].
 Message ID - 16-bit unsigned integer that is used to
detect duplicate messages and to connect
Acknowledgment/Reset messages with Confirmable/
Non-Confirmable messages.
The message header is followed by the Token field with
variable size from 0 to 64 bits. This field is used to link
requests and responses.
The optional Options field defines one or more options.
CoAP defines a single set of options that are used both for
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requests and for responses. These are: Content-Format, Etag,
Location-Path, Location-Query, Max-Age, Proxy-Uri,
Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, Uri-Path, Uri-Port, Uri-Query,
Accept, If-Match, If-None-Match, and Size1.
The payload of requests/responses that indicates success
typically carries the resource representation or the result of
the requested action.
Figure 2. CoAP message format.
Figure 3. a) Piggybacked response b) Separate response.
There are two types of responses: piggybacked and
separate (Figure 3). If the request is transmitted via CON or
NON message, and if the response is available and
transmitted via an ACK message, then it is piggybacked
response. If the server is unable to respond immediately to
the request, an Empty message (with code 0.00) is sent that
tells the client to stop sending the request. If the server is
able for later respond to the client, it sends a CON message
that must then be confirmed by the client. This is called a
separate response.
Similar to HTTP, CoAP uses GET (with code 0.01),
POST (with code 0.02), PUT (with code 0.03), and
DELETE (with code 0.04) methods.
IV. NEW COVERT CHANNELS IN THE COAP
When someone creates a Covert Channel (CC) in
network protocol, usually uses: a protocol feature that has a
dual nature (i.e., the same feature can be obtained in more
than one way), a feature that is not mandatory, a feature that
can obtain random value, and so on. Therefore, if we use
some of these features, we can create new covert channels in
CoAP. From the beginning, CoAP offers some protection
against network steganography. For example, by introducing
a proper order in the appearance of different options in
message, the steganographic techniques that deploy a
different order of options can not be applied.
CoAP can be applied in different fields, such as: smart
energy, smart grid, building control, intelligent lighting
control, industrial control systems, asset tracking,
environment monitoring, and so on. So, one useful scenario
of application of the CoAP covert channels would be for
support of the authentication of geolocation of IoT devices.
Another possible scenario is clandestine communication
between wearable devices in a hostile environment, for the
needs of the soldiers, or, between nodes in a wireless sensor
network.
As steganography offers security only through obscurity.
A successful attack against any covert channel consists in
detecting the existence of this communication. Next, the new
CoAP covert channels are presented.
A. Covert Channel Using Token and/or Message ID Fields
The Message ID contains a random 16-bit value. In the
case of piggybacked response for CON message, the
Message ID should be the same as in the request, while in
the case of separate response, the server generate different
random Message ID (while the request Message ID is copied
in the first sent Empty ACK message).
The same Message ID can not be reused (in the
communication between same two endpoints) within the
EXCHANGE\_LIFETIME, which is around 247 seconds
with the default transmission parameters.
The Token is another random generated field, with
variable size up to 64 bits, used as a client-local identifier to
make a difference between concurrent requests. If the request
results in the response, the Token value should be echoed in
that response. This also happens in the case when the server
sends separate response. So, we can create an unidirectional
or a bidirectional communication channel between two hosts,
by sending 16 (from Message ID) plus/or 64 (from Token
ID) bits per message (PRBR  {16, 64, 80}). According to
the pattern-based classification [18], this channel belongs to
the following class:
Network Covert Storage Channels
--Modification of Non-Payload
--Structure Preserving
--Modification of an Attribute
--Random Value Pattern
B. Covert Channel Using Piggybacked and Separate
Response
Since the server has a choice for sending piggybacked or
separate response, one can create an one-bit per message
unidirectional or a bidirectional covert channel (PRBR=1),
such as:
 piggybacked response to be binary 1, and
 separate response to be binary 0.
At heavy load, the server may not be able to respond
(sending binary 1), so this covert channel is limited to the
times when the server has the choice. According to the
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pattern-based classification [18], this channel belongs to the
following class:
Network Covert Timing Channels
--PDU Order Pattern
C. Covert Channel Using Payload of the Message
Both requests and responses may include a payload,
depending of the Method or the Response Code,
respectively. Its format is specified by the Internet media
type and content coding providen by the Content-Format
option. The payload of requests or of responses that indicates
success is typically a representation of the resource or the
result of the requested action.
If no Content-Format option is given, the payload of
responses indicating client or server error is a Diagnostic
Payload, with brief human-readable diagnostic message
being encoded using UTF-8 (Unicode Transformation
Format) in Net-Unicode form.
The CoAP specification provides only an upper bound to
the message size - to fit within a single IP datagram (and into
one UDP payload). The maximal size of the IPv4 datagram
is 65,535B, but this can not be applied to constrained devices
and networks. According to IPv4 specification in the RFC
791, all hosts have to be prepared to accept datagrams of up
to 576B, while IPv6 requires the maximum transmission unit
(MTU) to be at least 1280B. The absolute minimum value of
the IP MTU for IPv4 is 68B, which would leave at most 35B
for a CoAP payload (the smallest CoAP header size with
Payload Marker before the payload is 5B, assuming 0B for
Token and no options). On the other hand, constrained
network presents another restriction. For example, the IEEE
802.15.4's standard packet size is 127B (with 25B of
maximum frame overhead), which leaves (without any
security features) 102B for upper layers. The sizes of the
input/output buffers in the constrained devices are another
restriction of the maximal payload. Thus, we can create a
unidirectional or a bidirectional communication channel
between two hosts, by sending a Diagnostic Payload with the
smallest maximal size of 35B per message (PRBR=280).
According to the pattern-based classification [18], this
channel belongs to the following class:
Network Covert Storage Channels
--Modification of Payload Pattern
Another similar channel can be created by encoding the
data in some specific Internet media format (for example,
“application/xml” media type) and sending this format as
payload of a message with appropriate Content-Format
option (41 for “application/xml”).
D. Covert Channel Using Case-insensitive Parts of the
URIs
CoAP uses “coap” and “coaps” URI (Uniform Resource
Identifier) schemes for identification of CoAP resources and
providing a means for locating the resource. The URI in the
request are transported in several options: URI-host, URI-
Path, URI-Port and URI-Query. They are used to specify the
target resource of a request to CoAP origin server. The URI-
host and the scheme are case insensitive, while all other
components are case-sensitive. So, we can create a
unidirectional covert channel between the client and the
server using, for example:
 capital letter in the URI-host option to be binary 1,
and
 lowercase letter in the URI-host option to be binary
0.
Taking into account that a valid Domain Name System
(DNS) name has at most 255B, we can send at most 255B
per message, or in other words, the PRBR of this channel is
up to 255B. According to the pattern-based classification
[18], this channel belongs to the following class:
Network Covert Storage Channels
--Modification of Non-Payload
--Structure Preserving
--Modification of an Attribute
--Value Modulation
--Case Pattern
CoAP supports proxying, where proxy is a CoAP
endpoint that can be tasked by CoAP clients to perform
requests on their behalf. Proxies can be explicitly selected by
clients, using Proxi-URI option, and this role is “forward-
proxy”. Proxies can also be inserted to stand in for origin
servers, a role that is named as "reverse-proxy". So, we can
create similar covert channel using schema and host part
from the Proxi-URI option. A request containing the Proxy-
URI Option must not include URI-host, URI-Path, URI-Port
and URI-Query options.
E. Covert Channel Using PUT and DELETE Methods
The PUT method requires the resource identified by the
URI in the request, to be updated or created with the
enclosed representation. If the resource exists at the request
URI, the enclosed representation should be considered as a
modified version of that resource, and a 2.04 (Changed)
Response Code should be returned. If no resource exists,
then the server may create a new resource with the same URI
that results in a 2.01 (Created) Response Code.
The DELETE method requires deletion of the resource,
which is identified by the URI in the request. Regardless if
the deletion is successful, or the resource did not exist before
the request, a 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code should be send.
If somebody has a known representation of the existing
resource R1 on the server and if he knows that specific
resource R2 does not exist on the same server, a
unidirectional covert channel to the server can be created, in
this way:
 send request with PUT method to create the resource
R1 with enclosed known representation as binary 1,
and
 send request with DELETE method to delete non-
existing resource R2 as binary 0.
33Copyright (c) IARIA, 2018.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-661-3
SECURWARE 2018 : The Twelfth International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies
In this way, one bit per message can be sent (PRBP=1).
According to the pattern-based classification [18], this
channel belongs to the following class:
Network Covert Storage Channels
--Modification of Non-Payload
--Structure Preserving
--Modification of an Attribute
--Value Modulation Pattern
F. Covert Channel Using Accept Option
The Accept option can be used to indicate which
Content-Format is acceptable to the client. If no Accept
option is given, the client does not express a preference. If
the preferred Content-Format if available, the server returns
in that format, otherwise, a 4.06 "Not Acceptable" must be
sent as a response, unless another error code takes
precedence for this response. We can create a unidirectional
one-bit per message covert channel (PRBP=1), in this way:
 sending a given message without Accept option to
be binary 1, and
 sending a given message with Accept option to be
binary 0.
According to the pattern-based classification [18], this
channel belongs to the following class:
Network Covert Storage Channels
--Modification of Non-Payload
--Structure Preserving
--Modification of an Attribute
--Value Modulation Pattern
G. Covert Channel Using Conditional Requests
Conditional request options If-Match and If-None-Match
enable a client to ask the server to perform the request only if
certain conditions specified by the option are fulfilled. In the
case of multiple If-Match options the client can make a
conditional request on the current existence or value of an
ETag for one or more representations of the target resource.
This is useful to update the request of the resource, as a
means for protecting against accidental overwrites when
multiple clients are acting in parallel on the same resource.
The condition is not fulfilled if none of the options match.
With If-None-Match option the client can make a conditional
request on the current nonexistence of a given resource. If
the target resource does exist, then the condition is not
fulfilled.
If somebody knows for sure that given condition C1 is
fulfilled (for example, the resource is created or deleted in
previous message) and other C2 is not fulfilled, using either
of If-Match and If-None-Match options, a unidirectional
one-bit per message covert channel (PRBP=1) can be created
in this way:
 sending a given message without fulfilled condition
to be binary 1 (e.g., If-Match + C2), and
 sending a given message with fulfilled condition
(e.g., If-Match + C1) to be binary 0.
According to the pattern-based classification [18], this
channel belongs to the following class:
Network Covert Storage Channels
--Modification of Non-Payload
--Structure Preserving
--Modification of an Attribute
--Value Modulation Pattern
H. Covert Channel Using Re-Transmissions
If we are using CoAP in channels with small error-rate
(to cope with the unreliable nature of UDP), we can create a
unidirectional or a bidirectional covert channel using
retransmissions with PRBP=1, in this way:
 sending a given message only once to be binary 1,
and
 sending a given message two or more times to be
binary 0.
In this way, one bit per message can be sent. According
to the pattern-based classification [18], this channel belongs
to the following class:
Network Covert Timing Channels
--Re-Transmission Pattern
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Suppose that two IoT devices communicate with CoAP
every t seconds.
TABLE I. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE NEW COVERT
CHANNELS FOR SENDING THE MESSAGE “HELLO, WORLD!”
No. Type of CC PRBR Time (s)t=1s t=5s t=10s
1
CC using
token and/or
message ID
Fields
16 6 30 60
64 2 10 20
80 2 10 20
2
CC using
piggybacked
and separate
response
1 91 455 910
3
CC using
payload of the
message
280 1 1 1
4
CC using case-
insensitive
parts of the
URIs
2040 1 1 1
5
CC using PUT
and DELETE
Methods
1 91 455 910
6 CC usingAccept option 1 91 455 910
7
CC using
conditional
requests
1 91 455 910
8 CC using re-transmissions 1 91 455 910
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Any covert channel with a given PRBR will need at least
ceil(l / PRBR)  t (s)
for sending a message with length l bits.
We can evaluate the minimum time for sending the
message ”Hello, world!” using the newly suggested covert
channels. The message has length of 13 7-bit ASCII
characters or l=91 bits. Results are given in Table 1.
So, we can see that not all suggested covert channels in
CoAP are able to send short messages in real time, especially
the ones with PRBR=1. Still, the covert channels 3 and 4 can
be used for sending a short message per one CoAP message,
without raising any suspicions. If the time for sending the
message is not so important, one can choose covert channels
1 or 2, without raising any suspicions.
Additionally, we can evaluate the minimum time for
sending the 320x240 raw color image (with 24-bit pixels)
using the newly suggested covert channels. The size of the
image is 225KB or l=1843200 bits. Results are given in
Table 2.
TABLE II. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE NEW COVERT
CHANNELS WITH PRBR>1 FOR SENDING 320X240 RAW COLOR IMAGE
(WITH 24-BIT PIXELS)
Type of
CC PRBR
Time(s)
t=1s t=5s
1
CC using
token
and/or
message
ID Fields
16 115200(32h)
576000
(160h)
64 28800(8h)
144000
(40h)
80 23040(6,4h)
115200
(32h)
2
CC using
payload of
the
message
280 6583(>1,82h)
32915
(>9.1h)
3
CC using
case-
insensitive
parts of the
URIs
2040 904(15 min)
4520
(76 min)
The results from Table 2 show that most of the new
CoAP covert channels are not quite suitable for sending
images, because of the large transmission time. The covert
channel 3 is the most suitable for that purpose (it will send
225KB image in 15 minutes).
VI. CONCLUSION
New CoAP covert channels are suitable for sending short
messages. CoAP is the first specialized IoT protocol for
which network steganographic techniques are applied.
Considering that IoT will consist of about 30 billion objects
by 2020 [14], CoAP belongs to the group of most exploited
protocols in the forthcoming years, and its traffic will not
raise any suspicions. So, it is important to identify possible
ways of hiding data in it and trying to mitigate them. This
paper deals with the first part, leaving others to try to find a
solution for mitigating presented covert channels. One
solution is the deployment of active and passive wardens.
The next step is implementation and demonstration of
some of these covert channels, to present their functionality
and feasibility.
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